Who Pays If Grab and Gojek Merge? Consumers or Drivers?

As discussions around a potential Grab–Gojek merger intensify, concerns about its impact on Indonesia’s ride-hailing economy have resurfaced. The two platforms currently dominate the motorcycle taxi (ojek online) and food delivery markets, shaping the daily mobility of tens of millions of Indonesians. If the merger materializes, it would create one of the largest digital transportation players in Southeast Asia, yet it also raises a critical question: who will bear the cost of consolidation?

Will consumers face higher fares? Or will drivers absorb the impact through lower incentives and tighter commissions? This article unpacks the possible outcomes through a data-driven breakdown of tariffs, market structure, and regulatory dynamics.

Market Concentration and the Growing Pressure to Raise Fares

A combined Grab–Gojek entity would control an overwhelming share of Indonesia’s online ride-hailing market. Industry estimates often place their combined market share above 90 percent—effectively creating a duopoly reduced to a single dominant operator. Such concentration naturally raises concerns about the decline of healthy price competition.

In a highly competitive mobility market, fares are kept relatively affordable due to continuous incentives, discounts, and price-matching strategies. Over the past several years, both platforms have used subsidies to maintain customer acquisition and retain price-sensitive users. However, in a post-merger environment, these incentives may no longer be necessary. With fewer players to compete against, the merged company could rationalize its pricing structure, adjusting fares toward more sustainable financial levels.

Historical patterns back this concern. When fuel prices rose in previous years or when the government adjusted transportation regulations, discussions around fare adjustments quickly followed. The current government tariff guidelines, based on regional zoning, provide minimum and maximum fare thresholds, but ride-hailing companies still maintain significant flexibility, especially in surge pricing and incentive allocations. If consolidation happens, the pressure to increase fares or remove generous promotions becomes even stronger.

Across major cities, current tariff ranges often fall between Rp 2,300 to Rp 2,600 per kilometer in Jakarta and slightly lower in cities like Surabaya or Medan. While these numbers remain manageable for urban commuters today, a post-merger rationalization could shift prices upward, particularly if promotions are trimmed. Consumers, especially daily commuters, may feel the direct financial impact.

Drivers in the Middle: Incentives, Commissions, and Income Stability

While consumers face the possibility of higher fares, drivers and delivery partners face a different risk: lower take-home income.

Driver earnings are shaped by several variables:

• the platform’s commission rate (commonly 20%),
• the level of per-trip incentives,
• bonuses tied to peak-hour performance,
• and operational costs such as fuel and maintenance.

Any major industry consolidation inevitably pressures the merged company to improve margins. Without two separate cost structures, duplicate teams, and competing incentives, the merged entity will search for efficiencies. One of the easiest levers to control is driver incentives, which have already declined in recent years as platforms push toward profitability.

Driver associations such as Garda and URC have repeatedly expressed concerns about reduced bonuses and fluctuating take-home pay. Many drivers work 8–12 hours a day, and incentives can form a significant portion of their income. Even a 10–20 percent reduction in bonuses can materially change monthly earnings.

Moreover, discussions around a forthcoming presidential regulation (Perpres) on ride-hailing workers introduce uncertainty. Proposals circulating in public debate include a potential cap on commissions, such as a maximum 10% cut taken by platforms—an idea welcomed by drivers but disputed by companies. Without regulatory clarity, the merged company may adjust commission structures or incentive mechanics to balance profitability targets.

In the absence of competition, drivers would have fewer alternatives. Today, a driver dissatisfied with incentives can switch from Grab to Gojek or vice versa. A merged entity eliminates that fallback, reducing drivers’ bargaining power.

The likely outcome is a scenario where fares may rise slightly while driver incentives decrease—an imbalanced distribution of gains that favors corporate efficiency more than worker welfare.

The Regulator’s Role: Will KPPU and the Government Contain Prices?

The key factor that could prevent negative outcomes is regulatory oversight.

Indonesia’s Competition Commission (KPPU) has made it clear it will review any official merger filing. At this stage, the commission is monitoring developments but cannot intervene until a formal notification is submitted. Once that happens, KPPU can impose remedies, including behavioral requirements—such as price caps, transparency rules, or incentive fairness commitments—to ensure the merged entity does not abuse market dominance.

Parallel to this, the government is drafting a comprehensive Perpres regulating ride-hailing operations. Early discussions indicate that the regulation may address:

• platform commission limits,
• minimum tariff standards,
• worker protection frameworks,
• and platform obligations in managing driver welfare.

If the merger proceeds while the Perpres is finalized, regulators could leverage the merger as an opportunity to impose stricter compliance conditions. This is particularly crucial because the merger’s timing overlaps with policy strengthening efforts. In other words, consolidation could give regulators leverage—but it could also give companies more power if not balanced by strong oversight.

Global precedents from Singapore, the EU, and the U.S. show that regulators often scrutinize mergers in tech-driven markets due to risks of reduced competition. Indonesia will likely follow similar logic, especially given the essential role ojol services play in national mobility and digital economy infrastructure.

So, Who Pays? The Three Most Likely Outcomes

Based on current economic incentives and structural forces, three scenarios emerge:

1. Consumers Pay Through Higher Fares

This scenario unfolds if the merged company reduces promotions and raises base fares within government-approved zones. While fare increases may be gradual, daily commuters will feel the difference. A few hundred rupiah per kilometer adds up for users who rely on ojol multiple times a day.

2. Drivers Pay Through Lower Incentives

If regulators keep fares steady but the company seeks margin improvements, the burden could shift to drivers. Reduced bonuses, tightened requirements for incentive eligibility, or stricter commission structures could lower take-home pay.

3. Everyone Pays a Little - A Balanced but Costly Middle Ground

A moderate scenario: fares increase slightly while driver incentives decrease modestly. Consumers absorb higher trip costs, and drivers encounter income pressure, while the merged entity stabilizes finances through efficiency gains and reduced operational redundancies.

The potential Grab–Gojek merger presents a pivotal moment for Indonesia’s mobility ecosystem. Whether the financial burden falls on consumers, drivers, or both depends heavily on regulatory decisions from KPPU and the government’s final stance through the upcoming Perpres. Consolidation can bring operational efficiency and long-term sector stability, but without strong regulatory guardrails, the cost of that efficiency may be paid by the very users and workers who keep the ecosystem running.

The real question is not whether the merger makes business sense—but whether Indonesia can ensure that the benefits of scale do not come at the expense of public welfare.

Sources

1. Reuters - “Indonesia discussing plan for merger of Grab and GoTo, official says” - 7 November 2025
2. Financial Times - “Indonesia in 'golden share' talks as rivals seek to create $29bn ride-hailer” - 12 November 2025
3. Katadata - “Bocoran Perpres Ojol: Tarif, Komisi, Wacana Grab dan Gojek Merger, Asuransi” - 10 November 2025
4. Detik Finance - “Istana Buka Suara soal Merger Grab & GOTO, Singgung Danantara” - 7 November 2025
5. Bisnis.com - “Kemenhub: Pembahasan Kenaikan Tarif Gojek - Grab Cs Sudah Final, Harga Bakal Naik” - 30 June 2025
6. KPPU (Official statement) - “Ketua KPPU: Merger Grab-GoTo Jangan Melanggar UU Persaingan Usaha” - 21 May 2025